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Abstract
Oil and gas operators are now being driven to now operate beyond their origi-
nally conceived design life and field life. Asset life extension (ALE) beyond these
thresholds presents unique safety and business risk challenges for the oil and gas
industry. With aging equipment and facilities, operators face increasing challenges
in maintaining equipment reliability and integrity as well as operational safety.
Aging factors do not only involve hardware but also human and organizational
factors. Factors include corrosion, erosion, fatigue, equipment obsolescence, nor-
malization of deviance (accepting degraded conditions as being normal), changes in
codes and standards and lack of data to forecast future risks. The challenge is
magnified if there is a large fleet or large amount of aging assets that needs to be
managed. In this chapter, a responsible approach to ALE, where assets can continue
to be operated safely and resources are adequately managed, is provided herein.
Keywords: maintenance management, asset life extension, integrity management,
safety critical element, oil and gas producers
1. Introduction
Oil and gas facilities range from both upstream and downstream assets to
include offshore structures, onshore tank farm facilities. Offshore structures may
include the typical fixed offshore structures, monopods, guyed wire caissons to the
more complex deep water assets including Floating Production and Storage
Offloading (FPSO), Mobile Offshore Production Unit (MOPU), Tension Leg Plat-
form (TLP) and semi-submersible structures (Figures 1 and 2).
Extending operation facilities beyond design life presents safety risks, business
risks and operational challenges to the oil and gas industry. These risks affect
significant business decisions and need to be quantified and managed as we strive
for continuous operations of aging assets. Aging assets and equipment present
increased challenges in maintaining equipment integrity and hence, will need to be
managed accordingly. These could be because of a cumulative degradation and risks
over time, which includes:
• Degraded materials of construction due to corrosion related mechanisms;
• Erosion, wear, fatigue or cracking mechanisms;
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• ‘Slow burn’ degradation mechanisms;
• Obsolescence of equipment leading to potential lack of spares, high cost of
spares, etc.;
• Normalization of deviance associated with human factors (i.e. accepting
degraded conditions as being the new normal);
• Lack of data trending to forecast future risks to safety and business continuity;
• Failure to record the accurate status of safety critical elements (SCE) over
time;
• Changes to engineering codes and standards;
• Loss of technical competence (qualifications + training + experience) in the
industry;
• Introduction of foreign materials into the production systems (e.g. Chemicals
for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), downhole sand consolidation, chemical
tracers, off spec water injection, etc.).
Figure 1.
Typical offshore structures [1].
Figure 2.
Typical onshore tank farm facility [2].
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Assets are required to predict and understand the effects of deterioration, or
changing conditions associated with life extension and be prepared to intervene to
ensure that this demand can be met without adverse effect on asset integrity and
safety. Asset life extension (ALE) for a given design life expiry, refers to a condition
whereby an asset is approaching its intended design life. The main aging factors that
need to be considered when developing an ALE program are material degradation
(Figure 3), obsolescence and organizational issues. This is provided within Figure 4.
The status of the known degradation mechanisms applicable for safety barriers
should be evaluated and documented. The basis for acceptance of deviations and
management of change (MoC) is reviewed in as a justification for the new mode
and timeframe for continuous operations. The engineering evaluations of all
changes and eventually mitigation measures against all operating risks must be
documented. OGPs must review, evaluate assess all damage mechanisms or defects
that may impact the facilities or individual operating systems for the life extension
period. This is generally applicable to damage or defects where a temporary MoC
has been accepted due to a limited period of use and this period has since been
changed as a result of ALE considerations. The OGP is then required to re-assess the
basis for acceptance to verify that this is still valid for the new period. Components
or systems with a high consequence of failure, which are not available for inspection
must be identified, evaluated, analyzed, and qualified for life extension. It is
required that OGPs evaluate the consequence in case of failure, monitors
Figure 3.
Degradation of offshore structural component [3].
Figure 4.
Aging management [4].
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indications of failure and have plans for compensating actions if indications of
failure are found. Latest knowledge related to degradation and life extension shall
be applied.
A case study is provided within Section 11, to demonstrate a simple application
of the ALE framework and possible outcomes.
2. Operational context
As the Asset ages, there is increasing challenge to maintaining equipment and
installation integrity, compliance with Regulatory requirements and improve
economic hydrocarbon recovery from depleted fields. As such, life extension
analysis and evaluations must be based on the planned use of the facilities during
the life extension period. Changes to the operational conditions that can have an
impact on the efficiency of resource exploitation, the risk profile as well as the
performance of the barriers due to aging, must be considered. The potential changes
to the operational conditions that influence the degradation of barriers must be
identified and used as basis for life extension evaluations.
Based on Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Assessment and Documenta-
tion for Service Life Extension of Facilities, Rev1, 2012 [5] and operational data and
requirements, the following should, among others, be considered:
• reservoir depletion causing subsidence of the facility
• shallow gas detection and mitigation
• changes in climatic conditions resulting in changes to environmental loadings
and operating conditions
• Increased changes in fluid compositions that can adversely affect the corrosion
rates in certain systems
• Changes to the original design assumptions as provided in QRA etc.
• Well and drilling factors
• Plans for increased gas flow
• Need for new process or utility equipment due to changed flows, chemistry,
pressure, injection or chemicals
• Changes to the SCEs on the facility
• New methodologies to simulate damage and degradation.
• Changes to equipment usage.
3. An asset life extension program
The basis for the design and design life of facilities with its associated platform,
wells, subsea systems and pipelines may be different. When facilities are planned to
be used beyond design life, OGPs should define the life extension period for which
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the different parts of the facilities are planned to be used. An ALE framework
outlining the main tasks as a six (6) step process is proposed and provided below on
Figure 5.
3.1 Data and information
The collection of data and information is often the most challenging aspects of
commencing an ALE study. It is recommended that records be securely placed
within an electronic database generally used to manage asset integrity and reliability
solutions. The availability and accuracy of information should be evaluated for each
facility considered. The information should constitute design basis and specifica-
tions, design and as built drawings, design/(re-) analysis reports, inspection
reports, maintenance and repair records and specifications. Once these records have
Figure 5.
Asset life extension process [6].
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been complied, data quality measures should ensure the appropriate data for
screening. In some cases, the data analytics and trending measures give a better
representation of the data set and how this can be used effectively in an ALE
program.
3.2 Gap assessment
Gap assessment is the second stage of an ALE process. Identifying gaps can be
broken down to several steps, which includes:
• Identify hazards and critical barriers.
• Check integrity and functionality of barriers.
• Assess current performance of barrier against intent.
• Review historic performance of barriers.
• Review current state of maintenance and gaps.
The gap assessment shall focus on the barrier functions and the factors that
influence the barrier elements. This includes technical, organizational and opera-
tional elements. The gap assessment and recommendations are performed based on
the major inspection findings, root cause failure analysis reports, modification
implemented on the equipment, bad actor list, history of incidents, maintenance
report, overhaul findings, reliability data, operating and maintenance philosophy
and any condition monitoring recommendation. Any life extension recommenda-
tion must take the future technical condition, operating parameters and mode of
operation into consideration. The assessment should also include review of the
forecasted production profile, exploiting synergy with other related equipment
such that key assets and system infrastructure can be rationalized, optimized or
expanded. A process for the identification and correction of gaps is provided within
Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Process for identification and correction of gaps [5].
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The recommendations from the gap assessment are to cover all the remedial
actions necessary to prevent the risk associated with spare strategy, obsolescence
related to the equipment and spare parts, remnant life analysis and prediction of
future failures modes and degradation mechanism especially related to aging during
the extension period. The benefits of applying new technology in addressing the
gaps shall be evaluated. This could help mitigate or close gaps with less modifica-
tions or compensating measures. The Health and Safety Executive, UK (2013) KP4
Report [7] outlined the following safety management systems as being the barriers
on the facilities that are not to be breached. They include:
• Structural integrity;
• Process integrity;
• Fire and explosion;
• Mechanical integrity;
• Electrical, control and instrumentation;
• Marine integrity;
• Pipelines;
• Corrosion;
• Human factors.
In addition to the above mentioned the following systems may be considered
• Cranes and lifting equipment
• Telecommunication facilities
• Subsea systems
• Life-saving equipment
Oil and gas producers (OGPs) are to perform analyses and evaluations to dem-
onstrate and understand of how the time and aging processes will affect HSE, the
facilities barriers including technical operational and organizational aspects and
resource exploitation. They shall also identify measures required to mitigate the
impact of the time and aging processes (Figure 7).
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Assessment and Documentation for
Service Life Extension of Facilities, (2012) [5] provides good guidance on the
processes, resources and methodologies used in the ALE approach to find the “as is”
condition and re-qualification for life extension and how to implement and docu-
ment. Safety critical elements (SCEs) such as wells, subsea jacket structures, pipe-
lines, risers, mechanical equipment etc. are to be qualified for the continuous
operations and asset life extension. Quantitative and qualitative assessments are
generally employed for equipment where known degradation mechanisms are
prevalent and where quantitative models exist to calculate degradation, remaining
margins and prediction of remaining service life. Quantitative analysis including
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probability of failure (PoF) is generally employed for structures, pipelines, position
mooring, and flexible or steel catenary risers etc. and requires string technical
expertise and often specialist software packages. Qualitative assessments is also
possible but must be supported by effective data management and operating his-
torical data to make good engineering assessments.
3.3 Risk factors and assessments
Risk assessments must be performed to verify that the facilities risk level is
within acceptable limits in the period of life extension and As Low as Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP). The principle of ALARP is in widespread use in the oil and
gas industry. The following risk evaluations shall be performed based on the context
defined for life extension:
• Accumulation of Operational Risk Assessments (ORA), as some of which may
be decoupled because they have been considered in isolation and not in
combination, potentially resulting in unknown increased risks
• Risk assessment of major accident risk, Quantitative/Qualitative Risk Analysis
(QRA)
• Emergency preparedness and response
• External environment
• Occupational safety, health and working environment.
Ensuring risks have been reduced to ALARP means balancing the risks against
the costs to further reduce it. The decision is weighted in favor of health and safety
because the presumption is that OGPs should implement the risk reduction mea-
sure. It is expected that the latest available technology and knowledge related to
analysis of major accidents is applied. The conservatism level and any assumptions
made in risk assessments are to be assessed and evaluated for all continuous opera-
tions. The vulnerability, actual and expected effectiveness of the barrier function,
including technical, organizational and operational elements shall be included in the
risk assessment.
The OGP risk matrix consists of a consequence axis and a likelihood axis. The
consequences are those of credible scenarios (taking the prevailing circumstances
into consideration) that can develop from the release of a hazard. The potential
worst case consequences, rather than the actual ones (that may have occurred
Figure 7.
Recommended life extension assessments of barriers [5].
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previously), are used. After assessing the potential outcome, the likelihood on the
vertical axis is determined on the basis of historical evidence or experience that such
consequences have materialized within the industry, the entity or a smaller unit
(Figure 8).
3.4 Maintenance management system
Effective inspection and maintenance are important in ensuring asset integrity
and reliability. In developing the maintenance management systems an initial
review is required determine status and how the aging processes is covered in the
existing maintenance program. The review is to evaluate the need for updating
the integrity, reliability, vulnerability and consequence analysis for continuous
operations in the future. Experience and knowledge from documented failures and
lessons learnt shall also be part of the evaluation and be used to improve the
maintenance management system. In principle, the maintenance management
system should be within a computerized database with detailed history of the
operating, design, assessment, inspection and maintenance records accessible to all
key personnel.
4. Emergency preparedness
A review of the current emergency response systems must be performed,
including an evaluation of how operational changes and new requirements will be
met in the period of life extension. If there is a change in operating philosophy, HSE
Case shall be revisited. OGPs are to evaluate any likely operational or organizational
changes to the facilities that will affect the emergency preparedness and response
systems.
5. Organizational and human factors
Human factors area comprises methods and knowledge which can be used to
assess and improve the interaction between people, technology and organization to
realize efficient and safe operations. The factors should include organizational
Figure 8.
Typical risk matrix used by oil and gas producers (OGPs).
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structure, competency or training requirements, and succession planning. Human
factors analysis shall be performed where changes are made or where extended life
challenges the established human, technology and organizational context. Organi-
zational system is also a factor to be considered, which aspects include engineering
design, contract and procurement management. Engineering design and related
procurement activities require a thorough and careful consideration of asset aging
and life extension factor. The risk from each finding and the overall potential
(future) risks shall be evaluated before deciding on the implementation of
measures.
6. Assurance and verification
The OGP is to ensure that experience on lifetime extension from other installa-
tions and operating areas is applied to the analyses and evaluations carried out for
the application. Any specific relevant information shall be included in the applica-
tion document. OGPs are to ensure that the analyses and evaluation work has been
carried out in accordance with the regulations, the relevant company standards and
have been verified by the appropriate technical discipline authority.
7. Occupational health
The OGP will evaluate the status of working environment factors that are rele-
vant for life time extension, prior to the commencement of implementing ALE.
Factors that should be include considerations for chemical/radiation exposure,
lightning and ventilation, ergonomics, noise/vibration pollution, material handling
and storage, outdoor operations and accommodation facilities.
The main objective of the evaluation is to provide a status of the working
environment according to both technical and operational requirements. The assess-
ment/evaluation are appropriately based upon existing conditions at the facility,
and if necessary, follow-up with new evaluations and assessments as required. The
operational risks of each from each finding and the future risks shall be evaluated
before deciding on the implementation of measures for improving working
environment.
8. Engineering design
All assets are required to have design documentation available and accessible,
which supports effective design at all stages of the asset life cycle and in relation to
the management of aging life extension. All engineering activity to be undertaken
throughout the anticipated service life of an asset should properly address life
extension considerations.
9. Asset life extension for fixed offshore structures
Zettlemoyer [8] provides a template for the asset life of fixed offshore struc-
tures. In general, the main source of interest or ALE involves the jacket substructure
which are essentially made up of tubular steel sections welded together to form a
truss system. For fixed offshore structures, the jacket template or truss system is
10
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considered as a structural safety critical element (SCE), so the integrity must always
intact (Figure 9).
The jacket template substructure is to be assessed for ALE in terms of ultimate
strength of the structure and fatigue life assessments. The values for the ultimate
strength results are represented in terms of an RSR (Reserve Strength Ratio). The
RSR is the ratio of the base shear at collapse/base shear at the 100 Yr environmental
loading (i.e. the design condition). Ultimate strength analysis is also called a pushover
analysis or collapse analysis and involves non-linear analytical methods (Figure 10).
For new structures a RSR value is generally over 2.0. As platforms operate for
some time, degradation due to corrosion, damage due to accidental damage (vessel
collision, dropped objects) is possible. Offshore structures are inspected and anom-
aly management is performed to detect and repair damage based on severity levels
over its operations. It is expected that the RSR may be compromised and reduced if
damage is unmitigated.
For every operating region the acceptance criteria need to be determined as it
varies from region to region for varying levels of environmental loading. In the Gulf
of Mexico (GoM) minimum acceptance criteria based on API RP2A are provided in
Table 1.
The operations for fixed offshore structures can be extended if the platform in
principle has greater than its minimum RSR values. For asset life extension, it is
expected that all severe damage to structures has either been repaired or reduced to
a manageable condition, prior to the migration to ALE. In essence the topsides of
the fixed offshore needs to be appropriately assessed. This is generally done by
using a risk based maintenance (RBM) program where anomalies are rectified due
to severity levels. These topside RBM should be aligned to other topsides programs
including piping, equipment skids and vessels to ensure that the maximum use can
be made of allocated resources.
Figure 9.
Typical jacket substructure for a fixed offshore structure [8].
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The other key performance indicator for tubular joints is fatigue life prediction.
In recent years through the use of proper joint configuration in design, use of joint
flexibility approaches in analysis, the issue of fatigue life estimation has been argued
away. In principle the acceptance criteria for ALE for a fixed offshore structure is
the exceedance of the minimum RSR values. In recent years, integrity management
codes of practice including API RP2SIM (2014) [10], ISO 19902:2007 [11] provide
guidance on the ALE for fixed operating steel structures.
Figure 10.
Typical schematic for load displacement curve—ultimate strength [8].
Table 1.
Minimum RSR values for the Gulf of Mexico (API RP 2A, 2014) [9].
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10. Case study
10.1 Aging electrical component
Facilities are designed typically with a life span of 20–25 years. However, it is
becoming common for facilities, both on-shore and off-shore, to be operated
beyond its life span. While assets are designed for 20–25 years, equipment age
differently and suffer from different age-related failure mechanisms. Other than
aging, electrical, control and instrumentation equipment suffer from obsolescence.
This is primarily due to unavailability of components and end of hardware/software
support.
10.2 Situation
A downstream refinery experienced control issues with its two reactor and
regenerator slide valves on its Residue Fluid Catalytic Cracker (RFCC) unit. The
symptom, initially, manifested as valve hunting. This progressively worsen to the
point where the valves had to be put on manual hand wheel control. While this
action temporarily stopped the valve hunting, it made control of the reactor and
regenerator catalyst level very difficult as operators had to be on-site to adjust the
valve opening manually. Left unresolved, the likely consequence of this situation
was a process upset and RFCC unit trip. This would also cause a cascade effect,
resulting in the shutdown of other units, incurring significant production losses and
HSE exposure (Figure 11).
10.3 Problem analysis
The problem was initially thought to be due to a failure of the HPU control
module. However, the problem was traced, eventually, to a failing DC power supply
unit (PSU) which powers the control module. Once the problem was identified,
replacement of the power supply unit resolved the issue. What should be noted
from this seemingly straightforward problem is that both reactor and regenerator
HPU units had suffered from the same problem. On closer inspection, both power
supply units were of the same make and had been first installed (as part of the HPU
units) at around the same time. At the time of the incident, the power supply units
Figure 11.
A typical FCCU slide valve actuator (left) and HPU & control module (right) [12].
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were estimated to be 10 years old. Aging was attributed as the cause of the problem,
as within 6 months, another slide valve HPU had also suffered from an almost
similar problem.
There are several failure mechanisms that are typically found due to aging.
Unfortunately, a detail inspection of the power supply unit was not carried out to
identify the aging mechanism. Table 2 shows common aging mechanism for
primary containment (piping, vessels, heat exchangers), structures, safeguarding
systems and electrical, control and instrumentation (EC&I) [HSE UK RR823 Plant
Aging Study] [8].
10.4 Solution
The multiple failures within a short period of time was a strong indication of an
age related failure, as opposed to a random failure. As a result, several actions were
taken:
• All HPUs with PSU of similar make and type were identified.
• PSUs were replaced (like-for-like replacement).
• A Preventive Maintenance (PM) plan was created in PMMS to replace the
PSUs every 8 years.
• Learnings (failure mode, failure mechanism, failure rectification) were
incorporated into the technician training program for future ease of
troubleshooting.
Due to the potentially high consequence of production loss from this failure,
other components of the HPU were also scrutinized. Other critical components, and
possible single points of failure, were identified. These were parked for future
improvements for the next asset refresh cycle. A similar exercise to this would be to
perform a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.
To ensure these upgrades were implemented in the next possible opportunity,
the equipment upgrade was parked into the refinery’s 5-year CAPEX plan. The site’s
Table 2.
Typical aging damage mechanism (HSE UK RR823 Plant Aging Study) [13].
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Equipment Obsolescence Masterplan was also updated. This is typically reviewed
on a yearly basis to manage overall life cycle of aging EC&I assets. Figure 12 is an
example of an equipment obsolescence dashboard which lists EC&I equipment
asset, obsolescence status and remedial plan.
This case study highlights several important aspects of managing aging assets:
• Information is in the data. Useful insights can be obtained through data
analysis. Equipment failure rate, for example, will show whether an equipment
is approaching end-of-life. However, quality data is essential and data clean-up
often is required before analysis can be done.
• Obsolescence management is essential for EC&I equipment. All equipment
should be captured in an asset list and the aging strategy should be clearly
defined. This could be through various way which include replacement,
upgrade, life extension (through supplier extended support), life extension
(with available spares) or run-to-fail.
• EC&I equipment typically will have shorter life-cycle than an asset overall
design life. Therefore, EC&I aging strategy has to be put in place much earlier
than other assets such as structures and mechanical equipment. With E&CI
equipment, analysis down to the major component level (e.g. PSU) should be
done. This may need to also include supporting equipment such as interface
modules, equipment communicators and workstations as well as software.
• Remediation of aging asset can be based equipment criticality and/or actual
equipment condition. There are various methodologies that can be employed to
determine equipment criticality such as failure mode, effects and criticality
Figure 12.
Example of an equipment obsolescence dashboard (HSE UK KP4 report) [7].
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analysis (FMECA), reliability availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis,
and even layers of protection analysis (LOPA), among others. Each
methodology puts a different focus on equipment reliability and integrity.
• The human aspect of managing aging asset should not be under-estimated.
Knowledge is lost when people move or retire. Therefore, knowledge retention
is key in ensuring assets can continue to be managed safely and reliably.
11. ALE reporting requirements
As a minimum, OGPs should establish the following in their submission of ALE
Study Consent for Extension Report:
• Clarity on how the asset is to be operated during the extension period.
• Clarity on Fitness for Service to run up to Design Life, Remnant Life
Assessment, and Life Extension requirement and Gap Closure requirement for
the Asset
• Economic Analysis is performed with the following scenarios:
1. No Further Production Enhancement Action, for three (3) different
options of Crude Oil Price.
2. Shortest Extension Period, for different options of Crude Oil Price.
3. Longest Extension Period based on the longest remnant life of a discipline
assessed, for different options of Crude Oil Price.
4.Three further scenarios of extension period in between shortest and
longest period for different options of Crude Oil Price.
5. Sensitivity analysis for Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operational
Expenditure (OPEX) for a variety of scenarios.
12. Conclusions
Oil and gas producers are often driven to continue operations beyond its design
facility and are required to operate safely. There are many factors to consider
when providing an asset life extension solution to aging offshore or onshore facili-
ties. This chapter presents the key issues to consider and a prescribed methodology
follow in justifying asset life extension for an aging facility. At all stages of the asset
life extension, assets are required to satisfy the As Low as Reasonably Practicable
criteria as a minimum for each discipline and demonstrate fitness for purpose.
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